giving above: “He shall be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him, and he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, in the phrase: “Give as the judges determine,” the reference is to monetary restitution, so too here, in the phrase: “Give a life for a life,” the reference is to monetary restitution.

Rava says: That which the school of Ḥizkiyya taught diverges from the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and diverges from the statement of the Rabbis. The school of Ḥizkiyya holds that in the case where one intended to kill one individual and killed another individual, he is exempt from both liability to be executed, counter to the opinion of the Rabbis, and from the obligation to pay monetary restitution. As the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse states: “And he who kills an animal shall pay for it, and he who kills a man shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), indicating that one who kills a man and one who kills an animal are comparable.

This teaches that just as with regard to one who kills an animal, the Torah did not differentiate between whether he does so unwittingly or intentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in all these cases but rather to render him liable to pay monetary restitution, as one who kills an animal is liable in any event; similarly, with regard to one who kills a person, do not differentiate concerning him whether he does so unwittingly or unintentionally, whether he acts with intent or with no intent, or whether he strikes in the course of a downward motion or in the course of an upward motion, and this is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution in any event.

Accordingly, it is derived from here that one who commits a transgression carrying the death penalty is exempt from paying damages for his action, even if he is not given the death penalty in practice. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of with no intent? If we say that it means that he had no intent to kill at all and he happened to kill a person, that is unwitting murder that is mentioned explicitly in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the reference in the baraita is to one who does not intend to kill this individual, but does intend to kill that individual. And it is taught: This is not to render him liable to pay monetary restitution for the damage he causes in the process of killing him but rather to exempt him from paying monetary restitution. And if according to the school of Ḥizkiyya he is liable to be executed, for what reason was it necessary to exempt him from monetary restitution? Clearly the halakha is that one who is executed is exempt from payment.

Rather, must one not conclude from it that he is neither liable to be executed, nor is he liable to pay monetary restitution. With regard to liability to be executed in a case where one intended to kill one individual and he killed another, the school of Ḥizkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that he is exempt from the death penalty, and holds that he is exempt from paying monetary restitution as well.

MISHNA: With regard to a murderer who was intermingled with others and it is not possible to identify the murderer, all of them are exempt from liability to be executed. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber [lakippa] where they will eventually die.

With regard to all those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled with each other and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, they are all sentenced to the most lenient form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution than burning.

Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If burning were not more severe than stoning, it would not have been administered to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery. A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: If stoning were not more severe than burning it would not have been the death penalty administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper, as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith.

There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those who are liable to be killed by beheading were intermingled with those who are liable to be strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be beheaded with a sword, as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. And the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by strangulation, as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of a murderer who was intermingled with others. The Gemara asks: Who are the others with whom he was intermingled? If we say that the others are upstanding individuals, it is obvious that they are exempt; why would they all be punished for the transgression of one who happened to be among them? And furthermore, shall Rabbi Yehuda say in that case: The court gathers them into the vaulted chamber where they will eventually die? Can innocent people be left to die in this manner?

The Gemara cites a mnemonic, beit, shin, reish, kuf, for the Sages who address the above question: Rabbi Abbahu citing Shmuel, Rava, and Reish Lakish.

Rabbi Abbahu says that Shmuel says: Here we are dealing with a murderer about whom witnesses testified and the judges deliberated, but his verdict was not yet finalized; and he was incarcerated until the end of his trial, and he was intermingled with other murderers whose verdicts were already finalized. It cannot be determined which of them is the murderer whose verdict was not yet finalized so that he may be brought to court for the verdict. The reason for the dispute is: The Rabbis hold that a court finalizes a person’s verdict only in his presence. Since the identity of the one whose verdict was not finalized is unknown, he cannot be sentenced to death. Since one of them cannot be executed, none of them can be executed; therefore, they are all exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Completely exempting them is also not possible, since they are murderers. Therefore, the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber.

Reish Lakish says: In the case where a person who was accused of killing another was intermingled with others, everyone agrees that they are all exempt, because one is not punished for a murder committed by others. But here, it is with regard to an ox whose verdict for goring a person to death was not yet finalized, that was intermingled with other oxen whose verdict was already finalized, that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that based on the juxtaposition between them (see Exodus 21:29), the halakha is that like the death of the owner, so is the death of the ox, and just as a court finalizes an individual’s verdict only in his presence, a court finalizes the verdict of an ox only in its presence. Therefore, all the oxen are exempt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the court gathers them into the vaulted chamber. Since it is an ox that gored, and the other oxen were sentenced to be stoned, they are incarcerated until they die.

Rava says: