But according to the one who says that in a case where this permitted factor and that forbidden factor cause an outcome to be produced, that outcome is permitted, what can be said? Since deriving benefit from the bull that sired the offspring is permitted, deriving benefit from the offspring should be permitted as well.

Rather, Ravina says: Emend the baraita and say that the distinction in the baraita is: If before its verdict was finalized, the cow was impregnated and calved, its offspring is permitted. If before its verdict was finalized, the cow was impregnated and after its verdict was finalized it calved, its offspring is forbidden because the legal status of the fetus is not that of an independent entity; rather, its status is like that of its mother’s thigh, i.e., a part of its body. Therefore, when the mother is sentenced to death, the offspring is also forbidden once it is born.

§ The mishna teaches: All those liable to be executed with different court-imposed death penalties who became intermingled are sentenced to the most lenient form of execution. The Gemara noted: Conclude from the mishna that an individual who is forewarned for a severe matter is forewarned for a lesser matter. If one is forewarned that if he violates a certain prohibition then he is liable to be stoned, while in fact, he is liable to be executed with a less severe form of execution, the forewarning is effective and he is executed with the less severe form of execution. That is the reason for the halakha in the mishna that even those liable to be executed with a more severe form of execution are executed with the less severe form of execution.

Rabbi Yirmeya rejects that proof and says: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the witnesses forewarned the individual that if he violates the prohibition he is liable to be executed, without specification of the mode of execution. And this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to all the others, those who are liable for the various death penalties stated in the Torah other than the inciter to idol worship, the court executes them only when the following elements are present: The congregation, represented by the court, and witnesses, and forewarning just before the defendant commits the transgression. And the court does not execute him unless the witnesses informed the defendant that he is liable to receive the death penalty from the court. Rabbi Yehuda says: The defendant is not executed unless the witnesses informed the defendant by which form of death penalty he is to be executed.

Based on the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, it may be inferred that according to the first tanna, although they must inform him that he is liable to be executed, they are not required to inform him of the specific mode of execution. The Gemara explains the basis for the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda: The first tanna derived forewarning from the incident of the wood gatherer (see Numbers 15:32–36), who was executed even though even Moses did not know with which death penalty he was to be executed. Clearly, the mode of execution could not have been included in his forewarning. Rabbi Yehuda says: The execution of the wood gatherer was a provisional edict based on the word of God. The halakha throughout the generations cannot be derived from it.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are all sentenced to be executed by stoning, and the Rabbis say: They are all sentenced to be executed by burning. Rav Yeḥezkel taught a different version to Rami, his son: In a case where those who are liable to be burned were intermingled with those who are liable to be stoned, Rabbi Shimon says: They shall all be sentenced to execution by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution.

Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Yeḥezkel, said to him: Father, do not teach it in that manner, as it is difficult to understand: Why does Rabbi Shimon teach that the reason is specifically that burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning? Derive this halakha, that they are stoned, for a different reason: The principle with regard to a mixture is to follow the majority, and in this case the majority of the intermingled group is liable to be stoned. Rav Yeḥezkel asked Rav Yehuda: Rather, how then shall I teach it?

Rav Yehuda said: You should teach: In a case where those who are liable to be stoned were intermingled with those who are liable to be burned, where the majority is liable to be burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They shall all be sentenced to execution by stoning, as burning is a more severe form of execution. Rav Yeḥezkel, his father, asked: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say: They shall all be sentenced to execution by burning, as stoning is a more severe form of execution. If so, derive this halakha, that they are burned because in this case the majority of the intermingled group is liable to be burned, not because stoning is a more severe form of execution.

Rav Yehuda answered: There, in the latter clause, it is the Rabbis who say to Rabbi Shimon: According to you, who say that burning is a more severe form of execution than stoning, the fact that the majority is liable to be burned does not warrant the execution of the entire group by burning, since the minority was sentenced to stoning, which is more lenient in your opinion. That is not so, as stoning is a more severe form of execution. And that reason is extraneous, as in this case, they are burned because the majority of the group is liable to be burned.

When this narrative was heard, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Long-toothed one: