from where is it derived that the meat of a mother animal may not itself be cooked in its own milk? Say an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to an issue where the fruit is not prohibited with the fruit, i.e., slaughter, as it is permitted to slaughter two offspring of one mother on one day, the fruit is nevertheless prohibited for slaughter with the mother, is it not right that with regard to an issue where the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., cooking, as it is prohibited to cook a mother’s offspring with its milk, the fruit, i.e., the milk, should be prohibited for cooking with the mother? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to prohibit the cooking of the meat of the mother in its own milk.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse? It was just derived a fortiori. Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said: The verse is necessary because one can say that the case of a horse born of both a stallion and mare but which is the brother of a mule, i.e., its mother also bore a mule after being impregnated by a donkey, proves this a fortiori inference invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, but the fruit is permitted with the mother. One may not mate a horse with a mule, but one may mate a horse with its mother.

The Gemara rejects this: There it is the seed of the father that effects the prohibition of mating the mule with the daughter horse. The two may not be paired for reasons unrelated to their status as offspring of one mother. This ruling therefore proves nothing about the hypothesis that if two fruit cannot be paired, one can learn by a fortiori inference that the fruit cannot be paired with the mother.

And this explanation must be true, as the case of a mule born of a donkey and a mare and which is the brother of a female mule proves. As here one fruit is permitted with the other fruit, i.e., one may mate the male and female mules since they are of the same species, and yet the fruit is prohibited to be mated with the mother, i.e., the mare. This case illustrates that the prohibition of crossbreeding is contingent on paternity, and does not rest solely on the relation between the mother and the fruit.

Rather, Mar, son of Ravina, said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of a male Canaanite slave born of a female slave and who is the brother of a female freed slave proves it invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., the slave may not engage in sexual intercourse with his freed sister, and yet the fruit is permitted with his slave mother.

The Gemara rejects this as well: There it is the bill of manumission that effects the prohibition. The slave is prohibited to his sister only because she has been freed, not because they are both fruit of one mother, as the case of a male slave, son of a female freed slave, and the brother of a female slave proves. As here the fruit is permitted with the fruit, i.e., he is permitted to his sister, since they are both slaves, and yet the fruit is prohibited with his released mother, as she is now considered a full-fledged Jew. Clearly the prohibition is entirely contingent on the emancipation of one of the slaves, irrespective of their relationship.

Rather, Rav Idi bar Avin said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of diverse kinds of seeds proves it invalid. As it is prohibited to sow fruit of one species with fruit of another species, and yet it is permitted to sow all types of fruit with the mother, i.e., the ground, from which all fruit grows. The Gemara rejects this as well: Isn’t fruit of one species with fruit of another species prohibited only by means of the mother, i.e., the ground? The prohibition of sowing diverse seeds applies only when they are both sown in the ground, as wheat and barley can be placed in a single jug and they are not prohibited.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say: What is unique about fruit with fruit, e.g., the kid and its mother’s milk, which are prohibited for cooking together? They are unique in that they are two separate bodies that were never unified. Must you say the same prohibition of pairing applies to the fruit with the mother, i.e., the mother’s meat and its milk, which were once one body? Due to this reason, the extra verse stating: “In its mother’s milk,” was necessary to include the meat and milk of the same animal in the prohibition.

§ Rav Ashi says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption, even though the verse explicitly prohibits only cooking? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated elsewhere: “You shall not eat any abominable thing” (Deuteronomy 14:3). This verse teaches that with regard to any practice that I have made abominable, i.e., forbidden, to you, the product is prohibited for consumption.

And I have derived only that meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to consumption; from where do I derive that it is also prohibited with regard to benefit? It is derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated, “He shall not eat,” or “you,” in the singular, “shall not eat,” or “you,” in the plural, “shall not eat,” both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit are indicated. This is so unless the verse specifies for you that one may derive benefit, in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass, from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: “You may sell it to a foreigner” (Deuteronomy 14:21). Accordingly, one may provide such meat to a gentile resident alien in Eretz Yisrael by giving it to him as a gift, and to any other gentile by sale.

As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal carcass; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God.” From this verse I have derived only that it is permitted to provide such meat to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where is it derived that it is permitted to transfer an unslaughtered animal to a resident alien through selling as well? The verse states: “You may give it to the stranger…or you may sell it,” indicating that one has the option to do either of these.

The baraita continues: From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving as well? The verse states: “You may give it…or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Consequently, one finds that he may transfer an animal carcass to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through selling or through giving. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are to be understood as they are written; one may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving, and to a gentile only through selling.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yehuda holds that if it enters your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir says, then let the Merciful One write: You shall not eat of any animal carcass, you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it and also you may sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that it comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written: To a resident alien through giving alone, and to any other gentile through selling.

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the wording of the verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could say to you that this word “or” teaches one to prioritize to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the priority of giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile does not require a verse, as it is based on logical reasoning: You are commanded by the Torah to sustain this resident alien, but you are not commanded to sustain that gentile.

§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic device for the topics that will be discussed: Shabbat; plows; and diverse kinds of seeds; a mother and its offspring; and sending away of the mother bird from the nest.

Rav Ashi stated above that the product of any practice described in the Torah as abominable is prohibited for consumption. The Gemara asks: If that is so,