but the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Who is the woman characterized as a virgin in this context? It is any woman who has not seen the flow of menstrual blood in all her days, even if she was married and has experienced bleeding as a result of intercourse consummating her marriage. The time of a pregnant woman is from the point in her pregnancy when the existence of her fetus is known to all who see her. The time of a nursing woman is until she weans her child from nursing. If she stopped nursing, e.g., she gave her child to a wet nurse, weaned him from nursing, or her child died, and she saw menstrual blood, Rabbi Meir says: She transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from her most recent examination. And the Rabbis say: Even in those cases, her time is sufficient.

Who is the woman characterized as an elderly woman in this context? It is any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, at a stage of her life close to her old age. Rabbi Eliezer says: In the case of any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, if she then experiences bleeding, her time is sufficient. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if they then saw blood, their time is sufficient.

And in the above cases, with regard to what did the tanna say her time is sufficient? It is with regard to the first sighting of blood, but with regard to the second sighting, her status is like that of any other woman, and she transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from her most recent examination. And if she saw the first sighting as a result of unnatural circumstances, even with regard to the second sighting, the halakha is that her time is sufficient.

GEMARA: Rabbi Eliezer teaches in the mishna that there are four women who transmit impurity only from the moment that they saw menstrual blood, not retroactively. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard this halakha from my teachers only with regard to a virgin. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: You did not hear, but I did hear it. In other words, you may not have received a tradition from your teachers with regard to any other woman, but I did receive such a tradition. Furthermore, you heard a halakhic ruling with regard to only one woman, and I heard rulings with regard to many women.

Rabbi Eliezer continued his rebuttal with a metaphor from the practice of sanctifying the new moon, which required the testimony of witnesses: We do not say to one who had not seen the new moon to come and testify. Rather we give such an instruction only to he who saw it. Similarly, my opinion is weightier with regard to this issue, as I heard many rulings about the matter, whereas you did not. The Gemara reports: All the days of the life of Rabbi Eliezer, they would practice in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, i.e., only a virgin would be exempt from retroactive impurity. After Rabbi Eliezer’s passing, Rabbi Yehoshua returned the matter to its former custom, which was to follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they did not act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer during his lifetime? The Gemara answers: Because Rabbi Eliezer was a Shammuti, i.e., a follower of the rulings of Beit Shammai, and the halakha is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in their disputes with Beit Shammai. And the Sages held that if we act in accordance with his opinion in one matter, people will act in accordance with his opinion in other matters.

And that would be a problem, as if so, then during his lifetime, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, we will not be able to protest against them. But after Rabbi Eliezer’s passing, when we are able to protest against those who act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in other matters, Rabbi Yehoshua returned the matter to its former custom of deciding the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in this matter.

§ The Gemara mentions other instances in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases. One is the halakha that we just mentioned, of the four women who transmit ritual impurity only from the time of their sighting and onward.

And another is taught in a baraita with regard to a woman who experiences labor pain as a result of which she sees a flow of blood. Her discharge is attributed to childbirth rather than zava blood. The baraita asks: For how long must she be relieved from pain in order to be considered a zava due to her flow of uterine blood? She must have relief for a twenty-four-hour period. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the halakha is in accordance with his statement.

And another case in which the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer is taught in a mishna (68b): A zav and a zava must observe seven days without a discharge in order to attain ritual purity. With regard to a zav or a zava who examined themselves on the first day and found themselves to be pure, and they examined themselves on the seventh day and found themselves to be pure, but on the rest of the intervening days they did not examine themselves, Rabbi Eliezer says: The presumptive status of the zav and the zava is one of ritual purity. Rabbi Yehoshua says: In that case, the zav and the zava have counted only the first day and the seventh day, two of the seven clean days, and they must count another five days to complete the tally.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Akiva says: Since any impure discharge that they might have experienced in between the first and seventh days would negate their count and require them to restart the seven-day period, the zav and the zava have counted only the seventh day, and must count another six days to complete the tally. And with regard to this dispute, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, and the statement of Rabbi Akiva appears more correct than the statement of all of them. But the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the other case in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (Teharot 8:7): With regard to the exterior of vessels that contracted ritual impurity through contact with impure liquids, i.e., with liquids that had touched the carcass of a creeping animal, Rabbi Eliezer says, with regard to this impurity that applies by rabbinic law: These exteriors transmit impurity to liquids that come in contact with them, but they do not disqualify foods with which they come into contact. The mishna elaborates: They transmit impurity to other liquids, and even non-sacred liquids. And they do not disqualify foods, and even teruma. Rabbi Yehoshua says: These exteriors transmit impurity to liquids and they disqualify teruma foods, as well.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: I derived my ruling via an a fortiori inference from the halakha of one who was ritually impure, who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed. And if one who immersed that day, who has second-degree ritual impurity status and therefore he does not transmit impurity to non-sacred liquids, nevertheless disqualifies teruma foods with which he comes into contact, then with regard to the exteriors of vessels, which do transmit impurity to non-sacred liquids, is it not logical that they should render teruma food disqualified?

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, how does he refute this inference? The Gemara answers: He would counter that the halakha that the exterior of vessels are rendered impure through contact with impure foods or liquids is by rabbinic law, and the halakhot of one who immersed that day apply by Torah law. And there is a principle that one does not apply a fortiori inferences to derive conclusions by rabbinic law from cases that apply by Torah law. As by Torah law impure foods do not transmit impurity to vessels, and similarly, impure liquids do not transmit impurity to vessels.

The Gemara continues: And it was the Sages who issued a decree that the exterior of a vessel is rendered impure when it comes into contact with impure liquids, and they decreed that only liquids, not foods, are rendered impure when they come into contact with impure vessel exteriors. The reason for this is due to the liquids secreted by a zav or zava, e.g., their saliva and urine, which have a primary degree of ritual impurity and therefore transmit impurity to vessels. Consequently, with regard to liquids, which are apt to contract impurity, the Sages issued a decree that they contract impurity when they come in contact with these impure vessel exteriors. But with regard to foods, which are not as apt to contract impurity, as they must first be rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with a liquid, the Sages did not issue such a decree with regard to them.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Rabbi Eliezer agrees that if the interior of a vessel is rendered impure by contact with impure liquids, it renders impure any teruma foods that come into contact with it. But what is different about the exterior of vessels, that Rabbi Eliezer cited them as having a more lenient status? The Gemara answers: This is due to the fact that their halakhot are more lenient than those of the other parts of the vessel. As we learned in a mishna (Kelim 25:6): With regard to a vessel whose exterior was rendered impure by contact with impure liquids, its exterior is impure, while its others parts, such as its interior, its ear, i.e., its looped handle, its rim, the edge of the vessel that protrudes outward, and its handles, are pure. But if its interior was rendered impure, it is all impure.

These are the four cases with regard to which Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? In all of these cases we learned explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

And if you would say that he is teaching us the halakha with regard to the exterior of vessels, whose halakha we did not learn from the mishna, let Shmuel simply state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the exterior of vessels. The Gemara explains: Rather, this is what Shmuel teaches us: That a final halakha may not be learned directly from the Talmud, i.e., from a statement of a mishna or baraita that the halakha is in accordance with a specific opinion, unless the ruling is confirmed by amora’im.

The Gemara asks: And is there nothing more that can be added to the list of cases in which the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But isn’t there another case that we learned in a mishna (Yevamot 109a): Two brothers married two sisters, one an adult and the other a minor. If the husband of the adult dies, the Torah obligation of levirate marriage applies to the other brother, which is not abrogated by the rabbinic prohibition of the yevama as the sister of his minor wife. In such a case, Rabbi Eliezer says: