The Gemara asks: Does this prove by inference that the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permit one to eat this bread even when the flame is opposite it? But if this is the case, where do you find the case where it is prohibited according to the Rabbis to derive benefit from wood? Rav Ami bar Ḥama said: It is found in the case of a stool made from the wood. Although they hold that it is permitted to derive indirect benefit from the wood, even the Rabbis agree that one may not derive benefit from a stool that is made from the wood itself.

Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to an oven that one kindled with consecrated wood and baked bread in it, according to the Rabbis, who permitted the bread in the first case where it was baked with orla wood, what is the halakha? He said to him: The bread is prohibited. He responded: What is the difference between this bread and bread baked with orla peels? Rava said: How can these cases be compared? Orla is nullified in a mixture of one part in two hundred; it is possible that less than this amount of orla was absorbed by the bread. However, consecrated wood is not nullified even in a mixture of one part in one thousand. Therefore, even when there is only a miniscule amount of the consecrated matter in the bread it is still prohibited.

Rather, Rava said: If it was difficult for Rami bar Ḥama, this is what he found difficult: Didn’t the kindler of the fire transgress the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as anyone who unwittingly uses consecrated property for a non-sacred use violates this prohibition? And any case where the kindler of an oven misuses consecrated property by doing so, the wood is transferred to non-sacred status. The wood loses its sanctity when misused, and the one who misused it must donate other wood to the Temple in its place. In that case, the wood used to heat the oven is non-sacred wood and the bread should be permitted.

Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with wood which had been set aside for purchasing peace-offerings. This wood, while sanctified, has a lesser status of sanctity and does not become fully consecrated until the blood of the offering has been sprinkled. And this dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: If one unwittingly misused consecrated property, it becomes desecrated and loses its elevated status. However, if one used the object intentionally, it is not desecrated and remains consecrated. Since the act here is intentional, the consecrated wood does not lose its status.

The Gemara explains: What is the reason that when one intentionally uses this object it does not lose its status? Since it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as one is liable to bring an offering only for unwitting misuse of consecrated property, it is not transferred to non-sacred status. The same halakha applies to the wood set aside for peace-offerings as well. Since at that stage it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as that applies only after the animal’s blood has been sprinkled, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even if one unwittingly uses this wood, it is not transferred to non-sacred status; rather, it remains prohibited.

The Gemara asks: And anywhere the kindler of an oven transgresses the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by using consecrated wood, is it transferred to non-sacred status? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to all prohibited items that must be burned, their ashes are permitted after the burning, except for wood from an asheira? And consecrated ash is prohibited forever. Therefore, it is possible that when one kindles an oven with this consecrated wood, although he misuses consecrated property, the ash remains prohibited.

Rami bar Ḥama said: That baraita is discussing a case where a fire began on its own among consecrated wood and there is no one who misused consecrated property. Since this is the case, even the ash that is left from this wood remains consecrated property and one may not benefit from it. Rav Shemaya said: This baraita is dealing with those types of consecrated ash that require burial, such as the ash removed from the altar. As it was taught in a baraita: “And he shall take up the ash from where the fire has consumed the burnt-offering on the altar, and he shall put it beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). The phrase “And he shall put it” indicates that he must do so gently; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he must place all of it; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he may not scatter the ashes. Apparently, even after the offering has been burned it remains sacred, and one may not derive benefit from it. However, when it was burned it was not subject to misuse of consecrated property, as its burning is a necessary step in the process of sacrificing the offerings.

It was taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And a logical derivation leads to this conclusion: Just as that which is left over from an offering after the time period in which it may be eaten, which is not subject to the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, requires burning, so too, with regard to leavened bread, which is more stringent as it is subject to the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, all the more so is it not clear that it requires burning?

The Rabbis said to him: Any logical derivation that you derive whose initial teaching is stringent but whose subsequent consequences are lenient is not a valid logical derivation. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if one did not find wood to burn his leavened bread, must he sit idly and not remove it? And the Torah said: “You shall remove leaven from your houses” (Exodus 12:15), indicating that this must be done in any manner which you can remove it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda’s logical derivation leads to a leniency.

Then Rabbi Yehuda presented a different logical derivation based on the principle of: What do we find with regard to, rather than on an a fortiori inference (Rashash). It is prohibited to eat the leftover of offerings and it is prohibited to eat leavened bread. Based on this similarity, one can conclude that just as the leftover of offerings requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning.

They said to him: The case of an animal carcass can prove that eating the leftover of offerings is not a factor in determining whether or not leavened bread requires burning, as eating an animal carcass is prohibited and it does not require burning. Therefore, there is no clear connection between the prohibition to eat a particular object and a requirement to burn it. He said to them: There is a difference between these cases, as it is explicitly stated that one may benefit from an animal corpse. Therefore, the following comparison can be made: It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning.

The Rabbis said to him: The case of an ox that is stoned can prove that this is not a clear factor, as it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from such an ox and it does not require burning. He said to them: There is a difference between leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, as there is an additional factor that is not relevant to the ox. It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and one who does so is punished with karet. And it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread, and one who does so is punished with karet. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning. They said to him: If so, the fats of an ox that is stoned can prove that this too is an insignificant factor, as it is prohibited to eat the fats and derive benefit from them, and one who eats them is punished with karet, and they do not require burning.