This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. These prohibitions do not apply because the ḥalla does not actually belong to the owner of the dough; it is instead considered to be consecrated property. Rather, she should separate the ḥalla and leave it until the evening; and if it becomes leavened, then it will become leavened, but this is of no concern.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the tanna’im disagree with regard to benefit of discretion, i.e., benefit accrued from the option of giving ḥalla, teruma and tithes to whichever priest or Levite one chooses. The Sages debated whether this benefit has monetary value and would constitute a form of ownership. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. Therefore, one owns the ḥalla he separates, and he must be careful to prevent it from becoming leavened. However, Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. One does not own the ḥalla, and therefore he may allow it to become leavened.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone holds that benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, and here they disagree with regard to the principle of: Since, etc. As Rabbi Eliezer holds: We say that since, if he wants, he can ask to have his separation of the ḥalla voided when he regrets having done so, it is his property. Even if one does not actually revoke the status of the ḥalla, the fact that the potential for such an action exists indicates that he still maintains a form of ownership of this dough. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say that since he could theoretically revoke the status of the ḥalla, the dough is considered his. Consequently, he may leave it until the end of the Festival day without being concerned that it will become leavened.

Apropos the principle: Since, etc., the Gemara cites a related dispute. It was stated that the amora’im disagree with regard to one who bakes bread on a Festival day for use during the week. Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged because he has desecrated the Festival. Rabba said: He is not flogged.

The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged because we do not say that since guests may happen to visit him, the bread is fit for him on the Festival day itself. Rabba said that he is not flogged because we say that since guests may visit him, the bread is considered to have been baked for use on the Festival day itself. Even if guests do not actually come, he has not desecrated the Festival.

Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to you, who said that we do not say the principle: Since, etc., how is it permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat? He said to him: One is permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat due to the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin] instituted by the Sages.

Rabba responded: Due to the practice of the joining of cooked foods, which was instituted by the Sages, may one permit a Torah prohibition? Rav Ḥisda said to him: By Torah law, whatever one needs for Shabbat may be done on a Festival, and the prohibition against performing labor during the Festival does not apply to preparations for Shabbat. It was the Sages who decreed that one may not bake on a Festival for Shabbat, as a decree lest people say that one may bake on the Festival even for use during the week. And since the Sages required a joining of cooked foods, one has a conspicuous marker reminding him that baking on the Festival for Shabbat is permitted but baking on the Festival for a weekday is prohibited.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from a baraita: If one wishes to slaughter a dangerously ill animal before it dies on its own and becomes prohibited for consumption, he may not slaughter it on a Festival day unless there is enough time so that he can eat an olive-bulk of it roasted while it is still day. Rabba reads this statement precisely: The baraita stipulates that the slaughter is permitted if one can eat the meat while it is still day, although he is not required to actually eat the meat. Granted, according to my position, that I said that one may rely on the principle: Since, etc., this ruling is reasonable. Since if one wants to eat he may eat, due to that reason alone he may slaughter the animal. But according to you, who said that we do not say the principle of: Since, etc., why may he slaughter such an animal?

Rav Ḥisda said to him: He is permitted to slaughter the animal due to the monetary loss that would be incurred by not slaughtering it, and not due to the principle of: Since, etc. Rabba asked rhetorically: Will we permit a Torah prohibition due to monetary loss?

Rav Ḥisda said to him: Yes, although this factor on its own does not mitigate the prohibition. Rather, due to the monetary loss that would otherwise be incurred, one decided to eat an olive-bulk of the meat, although he does not need to. And since it is impossible to eat even an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering the animal, one is permitted to slaughter the animal.

Rabba raised another objection to him: The shewbread in the Temple