this verse teaches that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and one night; that is, it may not remain overnight until the morning of the sixteenth. Or perhaps it is eaten for only a day and a night; that is, it may not remain overnight until the morning of the fifteenth. Since for that it would have sufficed to say that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight,” when it says that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning” (Deuteronomy 16:4), the extra phrase “until the morning” indicates that the verse speaks of the second morning.

There is still room to say: Or perhaps it is eaten only until the first morning, and how do I establish what the Torah says, that a Festival peace-offering may be eaten for two days and one night? This applies to Festival peace-offerings other than this one. The baraita explains: When it says with regard to a peace-offering: “But if the sacrifice of his offering is a vow or a free-will offering, it shall be eaten on the same day that he sacrifices his offering; and on the morrow also, the remainder of it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:16), it teaches that any peace-offering, whether a vow or a free-will offering, or an obligation, including the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, is eaten for two days and one night.

The Master said above in the baraita: Or perhaps it is only the first morning. The Gemara asks: But you already said that when it says that any offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning,” the extra phrase “until the morning” indicates that the verse speaks of the second morning. What need is there then to prove this a second time? The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps it is only that the verse is speaking about two different Festival peace-offerings, one being the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth and one the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, and the halakha is that this, the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, may be eaten for only a day and a night until its morning, the morning of the fifteenth, and this, the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, may be eaten for only a day and a night until its morning, the sixteenth of Nisan.

It then says: But with regard to that which we maintain, that a Festival peace-offering may be eaten for two days and one night, if so, the verse that addresses a peace-offering and says: “But if the sacrifice of his offering is a vow or a free-will offering,” with regard to what case is it discussing? If it is talking about the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, surely it is written about it, according to this interpretation, that it is eaten for only a day and a night. And if it is talking about the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, surely it is written about it that it too is eaten for only a day and a night.

Rather, this verse that discusses a vow or free-will offering clearly must be discussing the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, and the entire other verse: “Nor shall…remain overnight until the morning,” is referring to the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth and thus has taught that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and one night.

The Gemara returns to what it wanted to prove with regard to the term “first”: The reason is that it is written that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning,” for what is the implication of the word morning? The second morning. We can infer from here that wherever the term morning is written unmodified and without further specification, it is referring to the first morning after the offering was sacrificed, even though the word “first” is not written in relation to “morning.” Thus, Rav Kahana’s derivation from the word “first” was unnecessary.

MISHNA: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, not knowing that it is prohibited for him to do so, is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it because he unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat.

As for all other offerings, such as a peace-offering, that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, e.g., if they were female or cattle or more than a year old and clearly ineligible for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Because he did not fulfill the mitzva to bring a Paschal offering, his act of slaughter was therefore unnecessary. And if they were fit, Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless deems him liable to bring a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression. But Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, because he maintains that if someone intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error he in fact performed a mitzva, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And in this case he performed a mitzva, because offerings that are sacrificed for a different purpose are still fit.

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If, with regard to the Paschal lamb, which is permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for its own purpose, when one changed its purpose he is nevertheless liable, then, with regard to other offerings that are forbidden to be slaughtered on Shabbat even for their own purpose, when one changed their purpose, is it not right that he should be liable? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, this reasoning is faulty. If you say that one is liable to bring a sin-offering if he slaughtered a Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it is because he changed its purpose for something forbidden, as the offering he intended it to be may not be slaughtered on Shabbat. But can you necessarily say the same thing about other offerings that he slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal offering and thus changed their purpose for something that is permitted to be sacrificed on Shabbat?

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let the communal offerings, such as the daily offering and the additional-offerings of Shabbat and the Festivals, prove the matter, for they are permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for their own purpose, and nevertheless, one who unnecessarily slaughters a different offering for their purpose is liable. This indicates that even when a particular offering may be slaughtered, one is nevertheless liable if he slaughtered a different offering for the purpose of the permitted offering. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say this halakha with regard to communal offerings, it is because they have a limit, as there is a specific number of communal offerings that must be offered on any particular day and there is no reason one would mistakenly sacrifice extra offerings for this purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the Paschal lamb, which does not have a limit, making it more likely for someone to make a mistake?

Rabbi Meir says: According to Rabbi Yehoshua, even one who unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings beyond their daily limit is exempt for the same reason, i.e., that he intended to fulfill a mitzva that is permitted on Shabbat.

The mishna continues with another halakha with regard to the Paschal lamb: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat and mistakenly intended it for those who cannot eat it, such as sick or elderly people who are unable to eat the meat, or for those who did not register for it, or for the sake of the uncircumcised or for those ritually impure, the offering is disqualified and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his unnecessary act of slaughter. If, however, he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, or for those who registered for it and for those who did not register for it, or for the circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised, or for those who are ritually impure and those who are ritually pure, he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb slaughtered with dual intentions of these types is valid, the act of slaughter was justified.

If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish, the offering is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat, as he should have examined the animal before it was slaughtered. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a hidden condition that would cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and that could not have been discovered before the slaughter even if it were examined properly, the offering is disqualified, but he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. This is not a case of shogeg, unwitting violation of Shabbat, but rather of ones, an unavoidable accident.

If he slaughtered it and afterward it became known that the owners had withdrawn from it and registered for a different Paschal lamb, in which case this one was slaughtered unnecessarily, as no one was registered for it, or it became known that they had died or became ritually impure, in all these cases he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, because he slaughtered with permission. At the time of the slaughter, he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the offering would be disqualified.